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The federal government entered the field of drug control in response to the
growing incidence of addiction in the United States at the turn of the 20th
century. The reasons for the increased number of addicts are not hard to
find. First, morphine was freely dispensed to the wounded during the Civil
War. It was estimated at the time that thousands of veterans were becoming addicted to the drug,' and after the war began to pass on the "pleasures"
of morphine to friends and relatives. Second, opium smoking was quite popular among Chinese immigrants imported to help build the American railroads. 2 As they settled in the Western states, the practice began to spread
beyond their ranks.3 Third, in 1898 heroin was introduced to the medical
world as the cure for morphine addiction. 4 Far from being a cure, however,
heroin was soon found to cause even greater problems of addiction. Fourth
and most important, opium and cocaine were common ingredients in various
patented medicines and sodas which were marketed widely throughout the
country prior to the early 1900's.5
The actual number of addicts at the turn of the century is a subject of debate. The first reported attempt to determine the extent of drug addiction in
the United States was undertaken in 1878 by 0. Marshall. In a report entitled
"The Opium Habit in Michigan," Marshall estimated that there were 7,763
drug addicts in the state.; Six years later, J. M. Hull estimated that there were
5,732 addicts in Iowa. 7 If these figures reflected a national pattern, there
were approximately 180,000 to 250,000 addicts in the country at that time.
A Vermont study in 1900 indicated that approximately 3,300,000 doses of
opium were sold monthly, enough to supply each Vermont adult, with 1%
doses per day.8
Early studies in the twentieth century showed no appreciable decrease in
addiction. In 1913, Dr. Charles Perry conducted an exhaustive study of
1. T. DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY 6 (1970),
THE OPIUM PROBLEM 66 (1928).
2. R. KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP 10 (1972) [hereinafter

citing

TERRY

&

PELLENS,

cited as KING]. See also
Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, World Opium Survey 1972 p. 1.
For a brief discussion of the opium problem among Chinese imported to build railroads
in Panama, see N. TAYLOR, NARCOTICS, NATURE'S DANGEROUS GIFTS 52 (1966).
3. The use of opium by the Chinese led to specific statutory controls. For instance, the importation of opium into the United States by "any subject of the Emperor of China" was forbidden by ch. 210, 24 Stat. 409 (1887).
4. T. DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY 8 (1970).
5. TERRY & PELLENS, THE OPIUM PROBLEM 66 (1928).
6. MARSHALL, THE OPIUM HABIT IN MICHIGAN, 1878 MICH. STATE BD. OF HEALTH
ANN. REP. 61-73; cited in Bonnie and Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of
Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition,
56 VA. L REv. 971, at 981-82, n.31 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bonnie].
7. HULL, The Opium Habit, 1885 IOWA STATE BD. OF HEALTH BIENNIAL REP.
535-45, cited in Bonnie, supra, note 6, at 981-82, n.31.
8. Grinnel, A Review of Drug Consumption and Alcohol as Found in Proprietary
Medicine, 23 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 426 (1905).
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drug addiction in Jacksonville, Florida. His report indicated that 541 persons, or .81 percent, of the city's population used opium in one form or another.9 If Perry's sample in Jacksonville was representative of the rest of the
country, there would have been approximately 782,118 addicts in the country in 1913-a staggering figure to say the least. Perhaps the most comprehensive early study, however-that done in 1924 for the United States Public
Health Service by Laurence Kolb and A.G. Du Metz-estimated that the
addict population of the United States "never exceeded 246,000."10
Although these various reports disagreed on the actual number of addicts,
they all seemed to agree on one point-drug addiction was a widespread
phenomenon in the United States. This fact soon became apparent to the
Congress and led to the passage of Federal laws aimed at controlling the drug
problem.
In order to trace the development of Federal drug control legislation this
paper will divide the topic into five parts:
Part I will treat pre-1970 Federal legislation dealing with narcotic
drugs;
Part II will focus on pre-1970 legislation dealing with non-narcotic
dangerous drugs, such as barbiturates and amphetamines;
Part III will discuss the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act of
1970;
Part IV will outline the structure of the Special Action Office for
Drug Abuse Prevention and the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement;
Part V will present separately an historical treatment of Federal
penalties for drug offenses.
PART I-FederalRegulation of Narcotic Drugs Priorto 1970
A.

FederalNarcotic Legislation to 1922

1. Opium Tariff Statutes
The earliest mention of opium (or for that matter, any narcotic drug) in Federal legislation appears in the Tariff Act of 1832.11 The Act-exempting
opium from all import duties-attempted neither to interdict the flow of
drugs nor produce substantial revenue. Ten years later in 1842, however,
the narcotic was placed on the tariff lists for the first time and a duty of
9. 1913 JACKSONVILLE, FLA., BD. OF HEALTH ANN. REP., cited in Bonnie, supra,
note 6, at 981, n.31.

10. KOLB & DUMEZ, The Prevalence and Trend of Drug Addiction in the United
States and Factors Influencing It, 1-20 (39 Public Health Reports No. 21) (May 23,
1924), cited in Bonnie, supra note 6, at 981-82, n. 31.
11. Ch. 227, § 3, 4 Stat. 590 (1832).
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seventy-five cents per pound was levied on all imported opium. 12 In 1862,
morphine was added to the tariff list and taxed at the rate of two dollars per
pound.'1 The tariff rates on medicinal or raw opium and morphine fluctuated throughout the nineteenth century. Raw opium even reappeared on the
duty free list in 1890.14 This use of imported opium as a source of governmental revenue was consistent with the flourishing international opium traffic of the nineteenth century. British traffic in opium had led to the Opium
Wars with China and generated a series of diplomatic concessions extorted
from the Chinese, concessions which assured continuance of the lucrative
opium trade.' 5 For example, in an 1858 treaty between China and the
United States, China agreed to remove opium from its list of contraband
items, permitting American merchants to sell the drug at various Chinese
ports. 6 With opium traffic so open and obvious, it was not surprising that
the United States government should view opium as nothing more than another imported item to be taxed.
Smoking opium, however, was singled out for special treatment during this
earliest period of federal concern. As previously mentioned, smoking opium
was first associated with the Chinese immigrant but gradually, as the practice
spread, it became a national concern. The response was an eighty per cent
ad valorem tax on all imported smoking opium. 17 In succeeding years, it
continued to be taxed at ever increasing rates, reflecting the growing fear
with which the practice was regarded.' 8 The magnitude of the problem
is suggested by one commentator who observed that between 1860 and 1913
approximately $27 million in revenue was collected from import duties on
smoking opium alone. 19
2. Pure Food and Drug Act
A second and quite different theme in federal narcotic drug control appeared
12. Ch. 270, § 8, 5 Stot. 548 at 558 (1842).
13. Ch. 163, § 5, 12 Stat. 543 at 548 (1862).
14. Ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 at 608 (1890).
15.

J. FAIRBANK, TRADE AND DIPLOMACY ON THE CHINA COAST:

THE OPENING OF THE

TREATY PORTS 1842-1854 151 (1953).

16. Convention with China, November 8, 1858. 12 Stat. 1069 (1858).
Opium had
been considered contraband under an earlier treaty between the United States and
China. Treaty with China, July 3, 1844, 8 Stat. 592, 599, 605 (1844).
17. Ch. 163, § 5, 12 Stat. 543 at 548 (1862).

18. From 1864 to 1890 the tax on smoking opium rose from two dollars and fifty

cents per pound to twelve dollars per pound. Ch. 171, § 11, 13 Stat. 202 at 212
(1864); ch. 255, Sec. 21, 16 Stat. at 265 (1870); ch. 121, § 2502, 22 Stat. 488 at 495
(1883); ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 at 569 (1890).
In 1897, however, the tax on smoking

opium was reduced to $6 a pound. Ch. 11, 30 Stat. 153 (1897).

Note also that, at the

time the tax on smoking opium was twelve dollars per pound, raw opium (now called

medicinal opium) appeared on the duty free list. Id. at 608.
19. W. ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAw:
MENT IN NARCOTIC DRUG CONTROL 8 (1961).

A

CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN EXPERI-
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on the scene in 1906.20 It came in response to a growing national concern
with the use of patent medicines. These commodities-heavily laced with
opium, morphine and cocaine-were widely sold throughout the country and
served as familiar preparations for such ailments as headaches, menstrual
pains, cold symptoms, alcoholism, and general fatigue. What resulted from
the heavy dependence on such patented medicines was a widespread pattern
of national addiction. The federal response conceived of the patent medicine
problem as one of consumer deception. Thus, to control the trade in these
medicines, Congress enacted labelling regulations in 1906, the idea being
that an informed consumer could protect himself if he chose to do so.
The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 prohibited the interstate shipment
of misbranded or adulterated food and drugs. 21 An article of food or drugs
was considered to be misbranded if it contained any alcohol, morphine, cocaine, heroin, or any derivatives or preparations of these substances where
such ingredients were not clearly marked on the label. Similarly, confectionaries were considered to be adulterated if they contained any narcotic
drug as an ingredient. The Act also provided that food would be considered
adulterated if it contained any added poisonous or deleterious ingredients
which might be injurious to health. By requiring labelling of medicines
which contained opium and cocaine, and by prohibiting outright the interstate shipment of food containing deleterious substances, the Act exposed to
public view the dangerous and addictive capacities of non-prescription medicines and sodas being marketed in the country. It should be noted, however, that this legislation was entirely consistent with a legitimate domestic
traffic in opium, morphine, heroin, and cocaine. Indeed, heroin was sold
by one pharmaceutical company under the heroin trade name and widely
touted; morphine could be purchased over the counter along with opium or
cocaine. 22 While the Pure Food and Drug Act alerted consumers to the
presence of narcotic drugs in various products, the sales of these drugs continued to flourish. For example, a 1910 pharmaceutical journal reported
2
that one drug store earned a profit of $60 a day from sales of cocaine alone. 3
20. At one earlier point, the narcotics menace seemed to be viewed as an educational problem by the federal government. In 1886, a law was enacted to include the
study of narcotics in the curriculum of federal schools. Ch. 362, 24 Stat. 69 (1886).
21. Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). Many states had adopted narcotic control laws
prior to the federal government. This article does not attempt to study these various
state regulations. For a good synopsis of early state drug legislation, see U.S. Treasury
Department, State Laws Relating to the Control of Narcotic Drugs and the Treatment
of Drug Addiction (1931).
22. See Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, World Opium Survey 1972, at 2. For an early report of how easily cocaine could be purchased, see
75 AM. J. PHAR. 474, 486 (1903).
23. 81 AM. J. PHAR. 35 (1910).
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Import and Export Regulations

In 1909 the federal government shifted from its earlier pattern of taxing
opium to outright suppression of the traffic in the drug. In response to the
Shanghai Opium Conference in 1909, the United States banned the importation of all smoking opium and restricted the importation of all other opium
except for limited amounts authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury for
medical purposes. 24 This had the effect of closing the United States ports of
entry to the legal flow of opium except in controlled quantities for regulated
purposes. Since the Act also forbade any person from receiving or selling
illegally imported opium knowing it to be illegally imported, the Act represented the first serious federal attempt to use the criminal law to curtail
domestic trafficking in opium.
Five years later, the United States took a second major step in the border
control of opium traffic when it set controls on the export of opium. With
these controls, Congress effectively took the United States out of the international drug traffic by prohibiting the use of its ports for either the import
or export of opium and other harmful drugs. Controls on export, like the
earlier controls on import, came in response to international pressures. At
the Hague International Opium Conference in 1912, the signatory powers,
including the United States, had agreed to place various restrictions on prepared opium, cocaine, and morphine--one of these restrictions was to align
export controls with the import controls of other nations. 25 Consequently,
Congress enacted the Narcotic Drug Export Act, 26 absolutely prohibiting

any smoking opium from being admitted into the United States for transshipment to another country and, more importantly, banning the export of cocaine and opium--other than smoking opium, the export of which was absolutely forbidden-to any country which did not regulate the importation of
these drugs. On the very same day that it passed the Narcotic Drug Export
Act, Congress also adopted a statute which levied a prohibitive tax of $300
per pound on all opium manufactured in the United States for smoking purposes. 27 Thus, Congress had now forbidden the import or export of smoking
24. Ch. 100, 35 Stat. 614 (1909).

Early attempts at combatting drug addiction in

the United States were doubtlessly influenced by the American experiences handling the
drug situation in the Philippines. After the Spanish-American War of 1898, the
United States took control of the Islands and faced a growing drug epidemic. For a
brief discussion of the American experiences with the drug situation in the Philippines,
see KING, supra note 2, at 10-14.
25. International Opium Convention, The Hague, Jan. 23, 1912. 38 Stat. 1912
(1915). On the early international opium conferences, see W. WILLOUGHBY, OPIUM
As AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM, THE GENEVA CONFERENCE (1925).
26. Ch. 9, 38 Stat. 275 (1914).
27. Ch. 10, 38 Stat. 277 (1914).
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opium, heavily taxed its domestic manufacture, and severely restricted the
import of other forms of opium.
4.

HarrisonAct

With the Harrison Act the federal government interjected itself decisively
into the domestic traffic in narcotic drugs. 28 This statute was by far the most
significant of all the early federal drug control laws, setting the main lines for
domestic narcotic control and regulation which persisted until 1970. The
thrust of the Harrison Act was twofold. First the Act sought to expose to
federal surveillance the legal traffic in narcotics from its point of entry or
manufacture to its point of consumption. Second, the Act provided criminal
penalties for any trafficking in narcotics outside the legally established patterns. The stage was thus set for the regulation of the legal narcotic flow
and the suppression of the illegal flow.
To achieve such broad purposes, the actual legislative scheme of the Harrison Act might be considered cumbersome to say the least. Congress chose
to assert jurisdiction through its revenue powers rather than through its power
to regulate interstate commerce. This rather curious approach was justified, however, since in 1914 the interstate commerce clause was still read
rather restrictively by the courts. In all probability, that clause would not
have supported any congressional controls over local drug manufacturers or
distributors. 29 Of course, Congress' decision to use its revenue powers placed
the domestic control of narcotics in the hands of the Internal Revenue Service, then deeply involved in the enforcement of the newly created federal
income tax, and later the Prohibition laws. Contrary to certain state patterns of narcotic control, this placed enforcement of the Harrison Act in the
hands of a special enforcement unit rather than in the hands of general law
enforcement officers.
By its terms, the Harrison Act required registration with the local Internal
Revenue Collector and payment of a special occupational tax by every person, with certain exceptions, who produced, imported, manufactured, compounded, dealt in, dispensed, sold, distributed, or gave away opium or coca
leaves or any compound or preparation of these drugs.3 0 The Act also stipu28. Ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
29. Manufacturing was considered a subject for local rather than national regulation.
See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
The constitutionality of the Harrison Act was upheld in United States v. Doremus,
249 U.S. 86 (1919).
30. The Harrison Act did not apply to the sale, distribution or possession of preparations containing minimal amounts of narcotic drugs, i.e. less two grains of opium,
Ys of a grain of heroin. Ch. 1, § 6, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
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lated that any sale, exchange, or transfer of these drugs must be pursuant to
the written order of the person to whom the drugs were to be transferred.
Written orders could only be executed on forms specially provided by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the forms themselves could only be
purchased by a registered person. Everyone in the drug distribution system
was subject to stringent record-keeping. Finally, it was unlawful for any unregistered or unpaid person to possess or control any restricted drug; such
possession or control was presumptive evidence of failure to register and
pay the occupational tax.
The Harrison Act was amended in 1919 by increasing the rate of the annual occupational tax and by imposing a new commodity tax of one cent per
ounce on all opium or coca leaves produced in or imported into the United
States.3 1 This commodity tax was in addition to any existing import duties.
The 1919 amendments made it unlawful for any person to purchase, sell,
dispense or distribute any of the aforementioned drugs or their compounds
except in the original stamped packages or from the original stamped packages. The absence of appropriate tax-paid stamps became prima facie evidence of a violation of the Harrison Act.
From the viewpoint of federal law enforcement officers, there was one
glaring gap in the coverage of the Harrison Act-the medical profession.
Section 2 of the Act specifically exempted from its coverage the dispensing
or distribution of drugs "to a patient by a physician . . . in the course of his
professional practice only."' 3 2 With narcotics tightly regulated, the physician

represented the sole legitimate source of supply open to the addict. For the
unscrupulous doctor, this presented a lucrative opportunity to push drugs
legitimately under the guise of practicing medicine. Huge profits could be
made. The "script doctor," as he came to be called, became a prime concern
of the early Internal Revenue Service personnel charged with enforcement
of the Harrison Act. For the responsible physician, the Harrison exemption
was not a source of new income; if anything, it was a source of unexpected
problems. As long as an addict was not confined to a hospital for treatment,
a doctor could minister to him in one of two ways-either by personally administering the drug to the addict in his office or by prescribing the drug for
the addict to administer to himself at home. If he treated the addict in his
office, the physician could minimize possible drug diversion into the illicit
market but at the expense of turning his office into a drug clinic with long
lines of addicts awaiting treatment.33 If he prescribed drugs for self admin31. Ch. 18, § 1006, 40 Stat. 1057, at 1130 (1919).
32. Ch. 1, § 2(a), 38 Stat. 785 at 786 (1914).
33. See LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 142 (1965)

[hereinafter cited as
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istration, the doctor created serious problems of illegal diversion. The dilemma was real and with no apparent solution. Because of the possibility
of diversion, law enforcement officials soon began to move to curtail the
medical profession's freedom to prescribe narcotics in the treatment of addicts. The unfortunate consequence of this policy was to drive from the
field of drug treatment not only the unethical "script doctor" but the legitimate doctor as well.
At the outset, the Harrison Act was not interpreted as interfering with the
physician's medical treatment of the addict, whether by prescription or otherwise. Thus, for example, providing an addict with morphine in the treatment
of his addiction was considered valid medical treatment to the extent that it
suppressed and alleviated withdrawal symptoms. In 1919, however, with
the Supreme Court's decision in Webb v. United States,a4 a series of cases
maintained otherwise. Although Webb was a "script doctor," the Court
was asked to decide whether a practicing physician's order for morphine was
exempt as a physician's prescription within the meaning of section 2 where
the order was not in the course of professional treatment in an attempt to
cure the addict but solely to keep the addict comfortable by maintaining his
customary use? The Court said no:
[T]o call such an order for the use of morphine a physician's prescription would be so plain a perversion of meaning that no discussion of the subject is required.35
One year later, in Jin Fuey Moy v. United States,36 the Supreme Court

was faced with another case involving a "script doctor." In elaborating on its
holding in Webb, the Court stated that the Harrison Act's immunity for
physicians dispensing or distributing drugs in the course of their professional
practice did not
include a sale to a dealer or a distribution intended to cater to the
appetite or satisfy the craving of one addicted to the use of the drug.
A "prescription" issued for either of the latter purposes protects
neither the physician
who issues it, nor the dealer who knowingly
37
accepts and fills it.
The most controversial decision in this area, however, was neither Webb
LINDESMrrH]. For a brief discussion of the drug clinics which were operated in various
parts of the country, see KING 33-39; LINDESMITH 135-161.
34. 249 U.S. 96 (1919). For a further discussion of this series of cases, see
KING 40-58; R. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the
Healersand the Sick, 62 YALE L. REV. 736-749 (1953); LINDEsMrrm 5-17.
35. 249 U.S. at 99.
36. 254 U.S. 189 (1920).
37. Id. at 194.
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nor Jin Fuey Moy, but United States v. Behrman, s decided in 1922. Behrman, a physician like Webb and Jin Fuey Moy, dispensed drugs indiscriminately. At one time, for instance, he had given an addict prescriptions for
150 grains of heroin, 360 grains of morphine and 210 grains of cocaine. 19
The Government, however, grounded its indictment on a holding that "prescribing drugs for an addict was a crime regardless of the physician's inten
in the matter. '40 Although the Supreme Court stressed the large amount of
the drugs dispensed by Behrman, the decision could be read by nervous
physicians as prohibiting all doctors from prescribing, in good faith, even
small quantities of narcotics for self-administration in an attempt to treat an
addict. After Behrman, it seemed that a physician could only prescribe
narcotics for conditions such as ulcers or cancer, but not for relief of addic41
tion itself.
The Behrman holding was soon tested in Linder v. United States. 42 Dr.
Linder had personally dispensed to one of his patients one tablet of morphine and three tablets of cocaine. Limiting the Behrman rationale, the
Court stated:
[The Harrison Act] says nothing of 'addicts' and does not undertake to prescribe methods for their medical treatment. They are
diseased and proper subjects for such treatment, and we cannot
possibly conclude that a physician acted improperly or unwisely or
for other than medical purposes solely because he has dispensed to
one of them, in the ordinary course and in good faith, four small
tablets of morphine or cocaine for relief of conditions incident to
43
addiction.
The Court further asserted that Behrman could not be interpreted as precluding a physician, acting in good faith and according to fair medical standards, from ever giving an addict moderate amounts of drugs for self-administration in order to relieve the conditions incident to addiction.
Although the language in Linder could be read to repudiate Behrman,
doctors were genuinely afraid to treat addicts. This fear increased as lower
federal courts seemingly disregarded the clear intent of the Linder rationale. 44 Now the addict could no longer turn to the medical profession for
help: he was forced to turn to a new source of supply-the growing illicit
38. 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
39. Id. at 288-89; KING 42.
40. KINo 42.
41. Id. at 43.
42. 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
43. Id. at 18.
44. Teter v. U.S. 12 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1926); Bush v. U.S., 16 F.2d 709 (5th
Cir. 1927); DuVall v. U.S., 82 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1936); Hawkins v. U.S., 90 F.2d
551 (5th Cir. 1937).
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drug market. As Rufus King remarks: "The addict-patient vanished; the
' 45
addict-criminal emerged in his place."
On the whole the Harrison Act has been criticized as an unenlightened approach to a difficult social problem. One European commentator summarized the situation in this way:
The Harrison Narcotic Law was passed in 1914 by the Federal
Government of the United States with general popular approval.
It placed severe restrictions upon the sale of narcotics and upon the
medical profession, and necessitated the appointment of a whole
army of officials. In consequence of this stringent law a vast
clandestine commerce in narcotics has grown up in that country.
The small bulk of these drugs renders the evasion of the law comparatively easy, and the country is overrun by an army of peddlers
who extort exorbitant prices from their hapless victims. It appears
that not only has the Harrison Law failed to diminish the number
of drug takers-some contend, indeed, that it has increased their
numbers-but, far from bettering the lot of the opiate addict, it has
actually worsened it; for without curtailing the supply of the drug it
has sent up the price tenfold, and this has had the effect of impoverishing the poorer class of addicts and reducing them to a condition of such abject misery as to render them incapable of gaining
an honest livelihood. 46
5.

The Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act

In 1922, Congress passed the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act 47
which continued the existing ban on opium importation while adding cocaine
to the list of drugs which were forbidden entry into the country. Limited
amounts of crude opium and coca leaves, however, were permitted to be
imported for medical and other legitimate needs. It is interesting to note
that, for the first time, all restricted drugs were classified under the generic
category of "narcotic drugs." A Federal Narcotics Control Board (composed of three Cabinet members) was created to administer various provisions
of the Act. For instance, the Board was empowered to determine exactly
what amounts of crude opium and coca leaves were needed to be imported
48
for legitimate and medical purposes.
1924 saw one important amendment to the Act. Although a certain
amount of crude opium could be legally imported for medical or other legiti45.

KING

43.

46. H. Campbell, The Pathology and Treatment of Morphia Addiction, BRITISH
JOURNAL OF INEBRIETY, 147-48
31 J. CraM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGY

(1923), cited in Lindesmith, Dope Fiend Mythology,
199, 204 (1940-41).

47. Ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596 (1922).

48. This function was later transferred to the Surgeon General of the United
States. Ch. 488, § 4(b) 46 Stat. 585 at 587 (1930).
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mate uses, Congress now prohibited the importation of any crude opium for
49
the purposes of manufacturing heroin.
There is one provision of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, however, which merits close scrutiny. Under the Act, possession of narcotics
gave rise to a two-fold statutory presumption-namely, that the narcotics
were illegally imported and that the defendant had knowledge of their illegal
importation.5" This presumption has been the subject of a vast amount of
litigation, culminating in the recent cases of Leary v. United States5' dealing
with its applicability to marihuana, and Turner v. United States,5 2 dealing
with its applicability to heroin and cocaine.
In Leary, the Supreme Court refused to reach the question of the validity
of the inference but held unconstitutional that part of the presumption which
related to defendant's knowledge of illegal importation. The Court reasoned
that inasmuch as some of the marihuana consumed in the United States is
domestically grown, it would be no more than speculation to say that even a
majority of possessors knew the source of their marihuana.5 3 Consequently,
absent proof that the particular possessor had actual knowledge of illegal
importation, the statutory presumption was not sufficient to uphold a conviction. In effect, the Court found no rational connection between the fact
proved-possession-and the fact to be presumed-knowledge of illegal importation.
In Turner, the Court upheld the entire presumption as applied to heroin
but declared it unconstitutional as applied to cocaine. As for heroin, the
overwhelming evidence showed that heroin consumed in the United States is
illegally imported and that anyone in possession of such heroin is aware of the
"high probability" that it had originated in a foreign country.54 In the case
of cocaine, on the other hand, it was determined that more cocaine is lawfully produced in this country than is smuggled into the country.5 5 Hence,
the Court could not be sure whether the cocaine that the defendant possessed
came from abroad or that the defendant knew of its illegal importation. In
such a situation, the presumption of illegal importation could not be applied.
49. Ch. 352, 43 Stat. 657 (1924).
50. Ch. 202, § 2(f), 42 Stat. 596 (1922).
51. 395 U.S. 6 (1969). For a further discussion of this case and statutory criminal

presumptions see Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions,
22 STAN. L. REV. 341 (1970); Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling
the Practical with the Sacrosanct, 18 UCLA L. REV. 157 (1970); and 83 HARV. L.
REV. 103 (1969).

52. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).

For a further discussion of this case as well as Leary, see

Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling the Practical with the Sacro-

sanct, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 157 (1970).
53. 395 U.S. 6, 46 (1969).
54. 396 U.S. 398, 416-418 (1970).
55. Id. at 423-24.
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B.

FederalNarcotic Legislation From 1922 to 1970

1. Porter Act of 1929
By the late twenties, the federal government was faced with a new problemlarge numbers of addicts in its prison system. As the patterns of addiction
grew and became associated with domestic crime, it was perhaps inevitable
that the addict population in prisons would increase. Congress responded to
the problem by enacting the Porter Act in 1929.56 The Act established two
United States Narcotic Farms designed to provide care and treatment of convicted addicts. The first was opened in Lexington, Kentucky in 1935; the
second at Fort Worth, Texas in 1938.
2.

The Federal Bureau of Narcotics

The growing narcotic problem also led to the emergence of a new federal
agency within the Treasury Department. Enforcement of the Harrison Act
of 1914 was entrusted to the narcotics division of the prohibition unit of the
Internal Revenue Service. 57 In 1927 this division was incorporated into the
newly created Prohibition Bureau of the Treasury Department.58 In 1930
law enforcement in the federal narcotics field was further developed and consolidated into its own separate agency, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 59
Of equal importance with the establishment of the agency was the appointment of Harry J. Anslinger as the new agency's first commissioner. Anslinger had risen through the diplomatic service and established himself later
at the Department of the Treasury as Assistant Commissioner of Prohibitition. 60 With the establishment of the Bureau of Narcotics, Anslinger
shifted his main concern from prohibition to narcotic law enforcement. Under his vigorous leadership the Bureau of Narcotics was shaped and developed into a powerful law enforcement agency.
3.

Informers Act of 1930

While the Harrison Act was cast in terms of a regulatory statute designed to
publicly expose the legitimate narcotic drug flow on the domestic scene, its
collateral and less obvious goal was to interdict the domestic flow of illegal
narcotics. This latter purpose obviously led to heavy criminal law enforce56. Ch. 82, 45 Stat. 1085 (1929).
57. See King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers
and the Sick, 61 YALE L.J. 736, 737, n.9 (1953).
58. Ch. 348, 44 Stat. 1381 (1927). King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison
Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 61 YALE L. J. 736, 737 n.9 (1953).
59. Ch. 488, 46 Stat. 585 (1930).
60. See KING 70.
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ment work. To facilitate this effort the Commissioner of Narcotics was empowered by Congress in 1930 to pay informers for information concerning
violations of the drug laws. 6 1
4.

MarihuanaTax Act
Although early federal legislation was mainly concerned with controlling
opium and cocaine, a new "drug menace" had appeared by the 1930'sthat "menace" was marihuana.6 2 In 1937, under the prodding of the
newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Congress passed the Marihuana
Tax Act-which was similar, in many respects, to the Harrison Act.6 3 The
Marihuana Tax Act required those in the chain of marihuana distribution to
register and pay an occupational tax. A commodity tax of $1.00 per ounce
was levied on transfers of marihuana to persons registered under the Act.
Unlike the Harrison Act where transfers could only be made to registered
persons, the Marihuana Tax Act allowed transfers to non-registered persons
but provided ample deterrents to such transfers by a prohibitive tax of $100
an ounce. To effect a legal transfer both registered and non-registered persons were required to file special order forms. Increasing federal control
over marihuana distribution even further, various reports and record-keeping
requirements were mandated. In short, Congress placed virtually identical
controls over marihuana as over the narcotic drugs.
5.

Vehicle Seizure Act of 1939
Like the Informers Act of 1930, the Vehicle Seizure Act of 193964 attested
to the continuing efforts of the Bureau of Narcotics to extend its control over
the growing black market in illegal drugs. By its terms, the Act made it unlawful to transport, carry, or convey any contraband article in, upon, or by
means of any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft. A contraband article was defined
as any narcotic drug which has been or is possessed with intent to sell or offer
for sale in violation of the law, or which is sold in violation of the law, or
which does not bear appropriate tax paid Internal Revenue Stamps. Any
vessel, vehicle, or aircraft (with certain exceptions) which has been or is
being used in violation of the Act was subject to seizure and forfeiture.
6. Opium Poppy Control Act
The outbreak of World War II disrupted the flow of opium to the United
61. Ch. 829, 46 Stat. 850 (1930).
62. It seems that Mexican immigrants and West Indian sailors introduced the practice of marihuana smoking into the border and Gulf states during the decade following
the Harrison Act. See MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, FIRST REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MAR UANA AND DRUo ABUSE 13 (1972).
63. Ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937).
64. Ch. 618, 53 Stat. 1291 (1939).
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States. There were those who decided that profit could be made by growing
the opium poppy domestically-ostensibly to provide necessary opium for
medical needs. A 1942 Act, however, prohibited any person who was not
the holder of a license authorizing him to produce the opium poppy, duly issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, to produce or attempt to produce
such poppies. 65 The Secretary, it should be noted, has never issued such a
license. 68
7. Drug Legislation of 1946
The increased availability of synthetic opiates-such as methadone-led
Congress to bring these drugs within the ambit of federal controls in 1946.67
Specifically, any drug which was found to have an addiction forming or addiction sustaining potential similar to morphine or cocaine came within the
purview of the federal statutes governing natural opium.
8. Increased Penalties-1951 and 1956
The unintended effect of the Harrison Act and its subsequent enforcement
was the closing of legitimate sources of supply to the addict, resulting in the
rise to a flourishing black market in illegal drugs. With the repeal of Prohibition, organized crime in turn became more involved with the illegal distribution of drugs. The inevitable result was an expanding drug problem.
The years between 1946 and 1960 were times of a rising drug trade in the
United States and, equally important, times of growing fears regarding the
drug problem. 8
Not the least of these fears was that drug use was reaching epidemic proportions among minors. In 1951, for example, a Special Senate Committee
on Organized Crime became concerned with the increasing number of drug
addicts among young people. The Committee found that, in 1946, only
three percent of the patient-addicts at the United States Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky, were below the age of 21, while just
five years later the percentage had increased to eighteen percent.6 9 Congress responded with the escalation of penalties for narcotic violations, first
in 195170 under the vigorous leadership of Congressman Hale Boggs, and
71
again in 1956.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Ch. 720, 56 Stat. 1045 (1942).
H. ANSLINGER & W. ToMPKINs, THE TRAFFIC IN NARcoTIcs 137 (1953).
Ch. 81, 60 Stat. 38 (1946).
See Note, Narcotics Regulation, 62 YALE L. REV. 751 and n.1 (1953).
SEN. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1951).

70. Ch. 66, 65 Stat. 767 (1951).

71. Ch. 629, 70 Stat. 567 (1956).
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The Harrison Act and subsequent statutes established the basic approach
to drug control by the federal government. The legislation of the 1950's did
not alter that approach. What prompted this legislation was the belief that
tougher penalties would deter involvement in the traffic by severely punishing
those who did not heed the warning. To this end, penalties were sharply
increased. Mandatory minimum sentences were instituted to prevent "soft"
judges from ameliorating the harshness of these strictures. In addition, a
drug offender's right to a suspended sentence or probation was curtailed.
These statutes will be discussed in greater detail in Part V of this article.
9. Narcotics Manufacturing Act
In 1960 the federal government once again broke new ground in the field
of narcotics control. For approximately forty years, the United States had
closed its ports of entry to the import and export of narcotic drugs and then
regulated and controlled the internal distribution processes with the Harrison
Act. However, the Act exercised no direct control over the quantities of
narcotic drugs legally manufactured within the country itself. The Narcotic
Manufacturing Act of 1960 sought to remedy this.7 2 Under this Act the
Secretary of the Treasury was empowered to license manufacturers of narcotic drugs and to set an individual quota for each drug classification. The
Government could not be assured that only those quantities of narcotic drugs
actually required for legitimate needs would be domestically manufactured.
This Act was significant in another respect. Before 1960, licensing was always viewed as a peculiarly local concern left to the several states. 73 Now
Congress asserted jurisdiction over licensing and, interestingly enough, based
its power-at least in part-on the interstate commerce clause, an approach
which had been rejected in 1914 when the Harrison Act was enacted. The
cumbersome fiction of a tax statute to justify local control over drug distribution was no longer needed.
10. Narcotic Addict RehabilitationAct of 1966 (NARA)
Still more new ground was broken with the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation
Act of 1966. 74 This Act, patterned on state legislation found in California 75
and New York, 76 was based on two existing approaches to drug rehabilitative
72. Pub. L. No. 86-429, 74 Stat. 55 (1960).
73. For example, see the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, §§ 3, 4 which provided for
state licensing. The Uniform Act was eventually adopted by almost every state.
74. Pub. Law No. 89-793, 80 Stat. 1438 (1966).
75. CALIFORNIA WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 3000-3305 (West, 1966) as amended,
(West Supp. 1968).
76. L. 1962, c.204, § 1. As codified in Article 9, McKNNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS OF
NEW YORK, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, as amended L. 1966, c.192.
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treatment. The first, embodied in the Porter Act of 1929, had led to the
creation of federal hospitals at Lexington and Fort Worth as places for confinement and treatment of the addict-criminal. The second was the longstanding concept that the mentally ill, the alcoholic, and the addict could be
legally confined and treated even in the absence of overt criminal behavior.
NARA was designed to funnel accused and convicted criminals out of the
court and prison systems and into rehabilitative confinement. Even where
no overt criminal conduct was involved, the Act provided rehabilitative confinement for addicts who voluntarily committed themselves or who were involuntarily committed by relatives.
PART II-FederalRegulation of DangerousDrugs Priorto 1970
Dangerous drugs are not to be confused with narcotic drugs which have been
previously discussed in Part I. Dangerous drugs include basically three
categories of drugs-depressants [including barbituates and tranquillizers],
stimulants, and hallucinogens.
When compared to narcotics, dangerous drugs became subject to federal
regulation rather late in time. It was not until 1965-with the amendments
to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act-that Congress imposed controls on the distribution of these drugs comparable to those in the Harrison
Act. 7 Before this time, individuals who unlawfully dispensed dangerous
drugs could only be prosecuted through certain misbranding provisions of
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.7 8
The 1965 amendments cover all dangerous drugs--whether in interstate or
intrastate commerce. Unlike the Harrison Act which was based on federal
taxing powers, Congress justified intrastate regulation of dangerous drugs on
interstate commerce theories. In the findings and declaration preceding
the amendments, one finds the following language:
The Congress hereby finds and declares that there is a widespread
illicit traffic in depressant and stimulant drugs moving in or otherwise affecting interstate commerce; that the use of such drugs, when
not under the supervision of a licensed practitioner, often endangers
safety on the highway (without distinction of interstate and intrastate traffic thereon) and otherwise has become a threat to the
77. Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, 79 Stat. 226
(1965). For an excellent general discussion of these amendments, see Rosenthal,
Dangerous Drug Legislation in the United States, 45 TEx. L. Rav. 1037 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenthal].
78. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 352, 355 (1970). Rosenthal, supra note 77, at 1051 n.86. The

government was required to prove "that the drug was introduced or received into interstate commerce, delivered for introduction into interstate commerce or misbranded in
interstate commerce." Id. This is no longer necessary under the 1965 amendments
since they apply to drugs in interstate commerce.
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public health and safety, making additional regulation of such
drugs necessary regardless of the intrastate or interstate origins of
such drugs; . . .79
For purposes of discussion, the 1965 amendment can be conveniently outlined in the following fashion:
A.

Definition of DangerousDrugs

The amendments categorize dangerous drugs as either depressants or stimulants. Depressant drugs include all drugs containing "any quantity of barbituric acid or any of the salts of barbituric acid" (a definition which does not
encompass many common tranquilizers); stimulant drugs are those containing
"any quantity of amphetamine, any of its optical isomers, or any salt of
amphetamine." 80 The definition of a depressant or stimulant drug, however,
includes the following significant language:
any drug which contains any quantity which the Secretary, after investigation, has found to have, and by regulation designates as having, a potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect. ..s
This language is the authority for controlling hallucinogens and nonbarbituric tranquilizers under the amendments. The Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare is granted discretion to exempt certain drugs from
the coverage of the amendments.
B.

Acts Forbidden

With certain exceptions the 1965 amendments forbade the manufacture of
depressant or stimulant drugs.8 2 Permitted to manufacture, however, were
manufacturers who were properly registered and who produced drugs for use
in research, teaching, medicine or for chemical analysis. 88 Sales were prohibited except by those legitimately in the chain of distribution and only in
the ordinary and authorized course of their business. Finally, possession (a)
other than for personal use of the possessor or a member of his household or
(b) for administration to an animal owned by him or by a member of his
84
household, was forbidden.
79. Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 2, 79 Stat. 226 (1965).
80. Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 3a; Rosenthal 1052.
81. Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 3a.
82. Id., § 3(b).

83. Id., § 3b; Rosenthal 1056-57.
84. See generally Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 3b; Rosenthal 1057-57. In 1968 possession
of dangerous drugs for personal use was made a crime. Pub. L. No. 90-639, 82 Stat.
1361 (1968). This change in the law was largely occasioned by the growing use of
LSD.
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C.

Registration, Records and Enforcement

The federal law was changed in 1962 to prescribe annual registration with
the Food and Drug Administration for those manufacturing any drug,
no matter what its type or character.8,5 The 1965 amendments, however,
further required manufacturers to include in their registrations whether they
were manufacturing or processing any dangerous drugs. 86 In addition, the
amendments demanded registration for wholesale distributors of dangerous
drugs.8 7 With certain exceptions, however, pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, and
physicians did not have to register.
Registration was not the only requirement of the 1965 amendments. Individuals who manufactured or disposed of dangerous drugs had to prepare
a record of each drug on hand when the amendments went into effect and
continue to keep future records of the manufacture and handling of such
drugs. These files were subject to inspection and copying by the appropriate
officials of the Food and Drug Administration. 8 Again, with certain exceptions, licensed physicians were exempted from all record-keeping provisions contained in the amendments.
It is interesting that enforcement of the dangerous drug laws was first
placed in the hands of the Food and Drug Administration in the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare-an agency responsible for the general
health and not particularly involved with law enforcement. In 1968, however, jurisdiction over dangerous drugs was transferred from the FDA to the
89
Justice Department.
These amendments were the final piece of legislation which preceded the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, with Title
II of that Act otherwise known as the Controlled Substances Act.
PART III-The Controlled Substances Act of 1970
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 197090 repealed almost all prior federal drug legislation and created a new and comprehensive scheme for federal drug control. For the first time, one statute
governed both narcotics and dangerous drugs. Enforcement of all drug laws
was placed in the hands of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(BNDD)-an agency created in the Justice Department in 1968 to combine
85. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, Title III, § 302, 76 Stat. 780

at 795
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

(1962), 21 U.S.C. § 360(b) (1970); Rosenthal 1055.
Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 4. Rosenthal 1056.
Rosenthal 1056.
See generally Rosenthal 1058-59.
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968, § 2(a), 28 USC § 509 (1970).
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970), 21 USC H§ 801 et. seq. (1970).
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the enforcement powers of the Bureau of Narcotics in the Department of
Treasury and the Drug Abuse Control Bureau of the FDA in the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare. 91 Although the 1970 Act totally revamped the existing pattern of drug control, a great deal was borrowed from
prior legislation-a fact that will become apparent as the provisions of the
Act and the federal regulations implementing it are analyzed.
A.

Jurisdictionto Legislate

As had been forecast by the Narcotics Manufacturing Act of 1960 and the
1965 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, authorization for the new legislation was found in the interstate commerce clause and
not in Congress' power to collect revenue. The cumbersome system of taxes
established by the Harrison Act and the Marihuana Tax Act was thus abrogated.
B.

ControlledSubstances

The Act establishes five schedules of controlled substances which include all
92
of the substances previously defined as either narcotic or dangerous drugs.
Because the schedule I substances have a high potential for abuse, have no
currently accepted medical use for treatment in the United States, and cannot
be used safely even under medical supervision, they are subject to rigid controls. Drugs in schedule I include certain opium derivatives-such as
heroin and hallucinogens-such as LSD, marihuana, and mescaline. Schedule II substances are also rigidly controlled since they too have a high
potential for abuse and may lead to severe psychological and physical dependence. Unlike schedule I substances, however, they do have a currently
accepted medical use in this country. In this schedule are included, among
others, the synthetic opiates such as methadone, the opium poppy and poppy
straw, coca leaves, and their derivatives, and any injectable liquid containing
methamphetamine.
Substances in schedule III have a potential for abuse less than the substances in the first two schedules and a currently accepted use in medical
treatment. Abuse may lead only to moderate or low physical dependence
or high psychological dependence. This schedule includes stimulants, depressants, nalorphine, and substances containing certain limited quantities of
specific narcotic drugs.
Schedule IV substances also have a currently accepted medical use for
91. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1970).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1970).
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treatment, but they have a low potential for abuse in comparison to those
substances in schedule III. That is not to say that the use of schedule IV
substances cannot lead to limited physical or psychological dependence.
Schedule IV contains such drugs as phenobarbitol and chloral hydrate.
Schedule V substances, like substances in the prior three schedules, have
a currently accepted medical use for treatment in the United States; but when
compared to any of these other substances, those in schedule V have an even
lower potential for abuse. This schedule consists of substances which, even
though they may contain small quantities of specific narcotics, also contain
enough non-narcotic medicinal ingredients to confer upon the compound or
mixture valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the narcotic content alone. Thus, paregoric or cough medicines containing small
amounts of codeine would presumably be considered a schedule V controlled
substance.
The 1970 Act also includes detailed criteria for the classification of controlled substances into schedules. It gives the Attorney General rule-making
power to add a substance to a schedule or transfer substances between
schedules if, after making the appropriate findings prescribed for each sched93
ule, he determines that any substance has the requisite potential for abuse.
Conversely, the Attorney General may remove a drug from all schedules if
his findings do not warrant inclusion of the drug in any of the five schedules.
Proceedings to make such determinations may be initiated by the Attorney
General on his own motion, at the request of the Secretary of HEW or on the
petition of any interested party.
Before initiating such proceedings, however, the Attorney General must
request scientific and medical evaluations and recommendations from the
Secretary of HEW. The Secretary will recommend whether or not the substance should be controlled, and, if so, in what schedule it should be included. In making his decision, the Secretary will consider, among other
things, the state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug, scientific
evidence of its pharmacological effects, the risks to the public health, and its
psychic or physiological dependence potential. Although the ultimate decision on control lies with the Attorney General, he is bound by the findings
of the Secretary of HEW. For instance, if the Secretary recommends that a
substance not be controlled, the Attorney General may not control it.
The above described procedure is slightly modified when United States
international obligations existing on the effective day of the Act require that
a substance be controlled. In that case, the Attorney General may control a
93. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (1970).
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substance under any schedule he deems appropriate without first consulting
the Secretary of HEW.
Before concluding this discussion, two final points should be mentioned.
First, the Secretary of HEW must inform the Attorney General whenever
a new drug application for a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic drug
is presented and the drug appears to have an abuse potential. Second, although the distinctions between narcotic and dangerous drugs have been
somewhat blurred by the 1970 Act, certain of its provisions continue to distinguish between them, resulting in the need to define a "narcotic drug."
Unfortunately, the definition provided by the Act is not sound from a pharmacological viewpoint. It encompasses not only true narcotics such as opium
and its derivatives, but also cocaine, a drug which cannot be classed as a
94
narcotic under any medical definition of that term.
C. Requirements for Individual Registrants
Although registration requirements may sometimes be waived, those who
manufacture, distribute or dispense substances controlled by the Act must
register annually with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in accordance with the regulations of that agency. 95
A separate registration must be filed for each principal place of business
or professional practice where the applicant manufactures, distributes, or
dispenses controlled substances. To assure proper registration, the BNDD
is empowered to conduct administrative inspections of the "controlled premises"-the physical plant of a registrant or applicant-to see that the statutory standards are being met. The Bureau may also conduct investigations
to verify or copy various records required to be kept by the Act. In most
cases, an administrative warrant is required.9 6
In certain respects, however, the provisions of the Act differ slightly with
regard to manufacturers, distributors and dispensers. Accordingly, each
category of registrant must be separately analyzed.
1. Manufacturers
The 1970 Act repealed the Narcotics Manufacturing Act of 1960, which pre94. A narcotic drug is defined, at least pharmacologically, as one that depresses the
central nervous system producing stupor, insensibility or sleep. Upton, Narcotics and
Other Drugs Susceptible to Abuse and Their Regulation, 10 N.H.B.J. 264, 265 (1968).
Cocaine is a stimulant, not a depressant.
95. 21 U.S.C. §§ 821-24 (1970). The Attorney General delegated his authority
under the Act to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. BNDD acts under the
general supervision of the Attorney General, however, see 28 C.F.R. Sec. 0.100. Procedure governing the registration of manufacturers, distributors and dispensers of controlled substances are set forth in 21 C.F.R. Part 301.
96. 21 U.S.C. § 880 (1970).
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viously governed the licensing of manufacturers and the setting of manufacturing quotas. According to the 1970 Act, the term "manufacture" means:
. . . the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, or

processing of a drug or other substance, either directly or indirectly
or by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently
by means of chemical synthesis . . . and includes the packaging or

repackaging of such substance or labeling or re-labeling of its container; except that such term does not include the preparation,
compounding, packaging or labeling of a drug or other substance in
conformity with applicable state or local law by a practitioner as an
incident to his administration or dispensing of97 such drug or substance in the course of his professional practice.
With respect to controlled substances in schedules I and II, BNDD will
register a manufacturer-applicant only if it finds that registration is consistent
with both the public interest and any international obligations of the United
States. In determining the public interest, certain factors must be considered,
among which are.
a) the maintenance of effective controls against diversion of controlled substances by limiting the importation and bulk manufacture of these substances to the number of establishments which can
produce an adequate supply for legitimate medical, scientific, research, and industrial purposes;
b) an applicant's prior conviction record under federal and state
drug laws; and,
c) an applicant's past experience in the manufacture of controlled
substances.
Registration requirements for the manufacture of substances in schedules
III, IV and V are somewhat less stringent. These manufacturers will be
registered unless it is determined that it would be inconsistent with the public interest. This places the burden of proof with respect to the public interest on the applicant who wishes to manufacture controlled substances in
schedules I or II, but shifts the burden to BNDD with respect to applicants
who wish to manufacture substances in the last three schedules.
In addition to meeting stringent registration requirements, manufacturers
of substances in schedules I and II must obtain an individual production
quota before they can manufacture. 98 Each year BNDD determines the
total quantity of each basic class of schedules I and II substances required
to be manufactured in order to provide for estimated domestic, export, and
reserve needs. Based on this overall production quota, individual production quotas are set so that the aggregate of individual quotas will not exceed
97. 21 U.S.C. § 802(14) (1970).
98. 21 U.S.C. § 826 (1970).

For detailed requirements, see 21 C.F.R. Part 303.
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the total amount of the substances needed annually. The Act specifies the
requisite factors which BNDD should consider in setting individual quotas.
Quotas are not required for substances in schedules III, IV and V.
Once he is registered and, if necessary, has received his manufacturing
quota, the Act requires that a manufacturer make a biennial inventory of
his stock of controlled substances on hand. Additionally, every registrant
must currently maintain a complete and accurate record of each controlled
substance manufactured, received, sold, delivered, or otherwise disposed of
by him. All such inventories or other records must be kept available for two
years for copying and inspection by BNDD officials. In the case of controlled substances which are also narcotics, the records must be kept separate
from all other records; in the case of non-narcotic controlled substances, the
records need not be separate but must be in such form that information is
readily retrievable from the ordinary business records of the registrant. Finally, manufacturers are required to make periodic reports to BNDD of every sale, delivery, or other disposal of any controlled substance. 99
2.

Distributors

According to the Act, the term "distribute" means the delivery of a controlled substance, other than by dispensing or administering.1' 0 Distributors
are thus to be considered as wholesalers of controlled substances.
The requirements for registration are essentially those for manufacturers
of schedules III, IV and V controlled substances. With respect to a distributor of any controlled substance, BNDD will register him unless the
agency determines that the registration is inconsistent with the public interest.
Once registered, a distributor may not distribute a controlled substance in
a commercial container unless such container bears a label with the proper
identifying symbol.' 0 ' A different symbol is required for each schedule of
controlled substances. In addition, if a substance is included in schedules
II, III or IV, the label must contain a clear concise warning that it is a
crime to transfer the drug to any other person. With exceptions, distributions of controlled substances in schedules I and II may only be lawfully
made pursuant to the written order of the person to whom the substance is
distributed.' 0 2 The written order must be on a form provided by BNDD
and can only be issued to persons validly registered (or exempt from regis99. 21 U.S.C. § 827 (1970). 21 C.F.R. Part 304 sets the detailed requirements for
records, reports and inventories.
100. 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1970).
101. 21 U.S.C. § 825 (1970).

102. 21 U.S.C. § 828 (1970).
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tration) under the Act. Like the Harrison Act before it, the 1970 Act envisions a distribution system which is regulated by BNDD at every step.
By and large, a distributor must take biennial inventories and keep adequate records just as the manufacturer. His reporting requirements are
slightly less burdensome, however. He is required to make periodic reports
only with respect to narcotic controlled substances and not with respect to
all controlled substances.
3.

Dispensers

The 1970 Act also applies to those who dispense controlled substances. The
term "dispense" means:
• . . to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner,
including the prescribing and administering of a controlled substance and the packaging, labeling or compounding
necessary to
10 3
prepare the substance for such delivery.
In effect, dispensers are the retailers of controlled substances.
As with distributors and manufacturers, each dispenser of controlled substances must annually register with BNDD. The four largest groups of dispensers or practitioners, as they are called, are physicians, pharmacists, researchers, and hospitals.
In order to dispense or conduct research with controlled substances in
schedules II, III, IV and V, practitioners will be registered if they are authorized to dispense or conduct research under the laws of the state in which
they practice.10 4 As for research with schedule I controlled substances, an
application must be referred to the Secretary of HEW who determines (a)
the qualifications and competency of each research applicant and (b) the
merits of each research proposal. Even if the Secretary of HEW approves,
BNDD may deny the request for specified reasons.' 0 5 Pharmacies-as distinguished from pharmacists--engaged in commercial activities, must be registered to dispense controlled substances in schedules II to V if they are authorized to dispense under state law. Each location must be registered
separately, except that a practitioner need not obtain a registration for an
103. 21 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1970).
104. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (1970).
105. Even though drug abuse is a centuries old problem, there is a serious lack of

information about how drugs work and their long term effects on the body. In the past
there have been strong federal policies against certain types of research. See DEALING
wiTH DRUG ABUSE, A REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION 14-15 (1972).
In the past
there has been little federal money spent on drug research, see id. at 13. There are recent indications, however, that the federal government is encouraging increased drug
research.
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office at which he does not dispense or administer controlled substances, but
where he only prescribes them and where no supplies of these substances are
kept. 10 6
Like manufacturers and distributors, dispensers have the obligation to
make biennial inventories and keep continuing records of all controlled substances received, sold, delivered, or otherwise disposed of. There are various
exceptions to this rule, however, one of which will be discussed here.' 0 7 Under the Harrison Act, a physician was required to keep records of narcotic
drugs dispensed showing the amount dispensed, the date, and the person to
whom the drugs were dispensed. The physician did not have to keep these
records with respect to drugs dispensed to a patient whom he "personally
attended."' 1 8 The new law substantially changes these rules. With respect
to narcotic drugs in schedules II, III, IV and V, a practitioner need not
keep records if he prescribes or administers such drugs in the lawful course
of his professional practice. 0 9 What is significant about the section is the
use of the words "in the lawful course of his professional practice." This is
the same type of ambiguous language used in the Harrison Act as a qualification of physicians' exemptions from using the special order forms and
which led to the Webb-Linder line of cases." 0 Whether the 1970 Act exemption will cause an equal amount of litigation remains to be seen. It
should be noted that the section does not grant an exemption for dispensing
schedule I substances or for anything other than prescribing or administering
narcotic substances in schedules II, III, IV or V. Thus, a pharmacist who
fills a prescription for such drugs must keep adequate records.
Finally, dispensers, unlike manufacturers and distributors, are not required to make periodic reports to BNDD. Except in an emergency or when
dispensed by a doctor, the Act also requires that no schedule H controlled
substance which is a prescription drug may be dispensed without the doctor's
106. 21 C.F.R. 301.23(h) (3).
107. 21 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1970). See also 21 C.F.R. Part 304.
108. Ch. 1, § 2(a), 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
109. Under the new law, it would seem that there is no requirement for methadone
maintenance programs to maintain records of the amount of the drug dispensed and the
recipients of the drug, since the methadone would be administered in the lawful course
of medical practice. An argument could be made, however, that records might have to
be kept if the methadone is given to the patient for self-administration-such treatment
might not be considered "prescribing or administering" methadone under the meaning
of the Act. See Whitford, The Physician, The Law, and The Drug Abuser, 119 U.
PA. L. REv. 933, 956 and n.96 (1971). In any event, the Food and Drug Administration separately requires methadone maintenance programs to maintain records on patients treated in order to be allowed to use methadone, a drug which has not yet been
approved as fully safe and effective. Id. at 954-57.
110. See discussion supra,and accompanying text.
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written order."' Schedules III and IV substances may be dispensed pursuant to either oral or written prescriptions.
D. Import and Export
Title III of the 1970 Act-known as the Controlled Substances Import and
112
Export Act-deals with the export and import of controlled substances.
Prior federal law, including the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act of
1922, prohibited the importation of narcotics such as opium and coca leaves
except for limited amounts needed for medical or scientific uses. The new
Act forbids the importation of all substances in schedules I and II and narcotic drugs in schedules III, IV and V. The Attorney General, however,
may allow the importation of such amounts of crude opium and coca leaves
as he finds necessary to provide for the medical, scientific and other legitimate needs of the country. In an emergency when domestic supplies are
found inadequate or when there is inadequate competition among domestic
manufacturers, the Attorney General may also permit the importation of
other prohibited drugs if he finds it necessary to provide for the country's
legitimate needs. Crude opium, may not, however, be imported for the
manufacture of heroin.
To import a non-narcotic controlled substance in schedules III, IV and V,
it must be shown that the drug is imported for a legitimate purpose and pursuant to various requirements prescribed by BNDD.
The export of a narcotic drug in schedules I, II, III and IV is forbidden
unless the destination country is a party to certain international conventions on
narcotics, maintains a system to control narcotics importation which is
deemed adequate by BNDD, the person to whom the narcotic is delivered
is licensed by the country of importation, and a proper export permit has
been issued. 1 3 Similarly, BNDD must be satisfied that the narcotic drug
is to be applied to medical or scientific uses within the country of import or
that there is an actual medical or scientific need for the drug in that country.
The statutory provisions governing the export of non-narcotic substances and
the transshipment of all controlled substances are less rigid than the export
restrictions placed on the export of narcotics.
As in Title II, there are annual registration requirements for importers and
exporters. 1 4 With respect to controlled substances in schedules I or II, an
111. 21 U.S.C. § 829 (1970). See also 21 C.F.R. Part 306.

112. 21 U.S.C. § 951 (1970). The authority and functions of the Attorney General under Title III were delegated to the Director of BNDD under the Attorney General's supervision. 21 C.F.R. Sec. 0.100. Regulations are to be found in 21 C.F.R.

Part 312.
113. 21 U.S.C. § 953 (1970).
114. 21 U.S.C. §§ 957-58 (1970).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 22:586

importer or exporter will be registered if such registration is consistent with
the public interest and with the international obligations of the United States.
Such registration, however, only authorizes import or export of the substances specified in the registration. Alternatively, an importer of a controlled substance in schedules III, IV, or V or an exporter of a controlled
substance in schedules III or IV will be registered unless it is inconsistent
with the public interest. As with manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers
under Title II, separate registration is required for each principal place of
business where the applicant imports or exports controlled substances.
Title III makes it unlawful for a person to manufacture or distribute a
schedule I or II substance with the intent or knowledge that it will be illegally imported into the United States."-" This provision is intended to
reach those who manufacture or distribute these substances outside the
United States intending that they ultimately reach the United States. The
United States District Court at the point of the offender's entry into the
United States has jurisdiction to hear the case.
PART IV-Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and Office
for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement
On June 17, 1971, by Executive Order, 116 President Nixon established, in
the Executive Office of the President, the Special Action Office for Drug
Abuse Prevention, the Director of which was to be his official representative
in matters concerning drug abuse prevention. In March of 1972, Congress
gave the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention a statutory exist117
ence and expanded the responsibilities of its Director, Dr. Jerome H. Jaffe.
A.

Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP)

The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention 1 8 is given jurisdiction over all federal programs in the area of drug abuse-as distinct from
drug traffic-prevention. Drug abuse prevention includes programs relating
to education, training, treatment, rehabilitation, and research in the field of
drug abuse, while drug traffic prevention covers law enforcement activities
and diplomatic or international efforts relating to drug traffic. Thus, since
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs primarily enforces federal
drug laws, these law enforcement functions are not under the jurisdiction of
115.
116.
117.
65.
118.

21 U.S.C. § 959 (1970).
Exec. Order No. 11,599, June 17, 1971.
Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972.
See id., Title I, §§ 201-255.

Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat.
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the Special Action Office. BNDD's educational materials, however, are
subject to the control of the Special Action Office.
Within the field of drug abuse prevention, the Special Action Office is
charged with (a) focusing the comprehensive resources of the federal government on drug abuse with the immediate objective of significantly reducing
the incidence of drug abuse within the shortest period of time; and (b) developing a comprehensive, coordinated strategy to combat drug abuse. One
of its main tasks will be to eliminate duplication, overlap, or conflict among
federal drug abuse programs and ensure that all federal drug abuse laws,
guidelines, regulations, and standards are consistent with each other and with
overall national policy. Congress has given the Special Action Office three
years in which to accomplish its mission. As of June 30, 1975, the Office is
abolished unless, of course, its life is extended by Congress. By that time, it
is hoped, the separate federal agencies will be able to proceed in concert
in the field of drug abuse prevention.
B.

Functions of the Director of the Special Action Office for
Drug Abuse Prevention

The Director of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
main responsibilities of the Director are briefly summarized below: 119
1. The Director establishes the overall planning and policy objectives for
federal drug abuse prevention efforts. He reviews all existing guidelines,
regulations, procedures and criteria of federal agencies to insure that they
are consistent with his policies, priorities and objectives. If necessary, the
Director may recommend that an agency effect changes in its organization,
management and personnel.
2. The Director reviews all federal laws relating to health, education, and
welfare and assures that the agencies who administer these laws view drug
abuse as a health problem.
3. The Director may review implementation plans and budget requests of
any federal agency for all federal drug abuse programs. He also has the
power to place someone from his office or from some other federal agency
in any federal drug abuse program for a short period of time to evaluate the
performance of that program.
4. The Director is to encourage certain research and to create, develop
and test:
i. non-addictive synthetic analgesics to replace opium and its derivatives in medical use;
119.

See generally, id. §§ 221-223.
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ii. long-lasting non-addictive blocking or antagonistic drugs or
other pharmacological substances for the treatment of heroin
addiction; and
iii. detoxification agents which, when administered, will ease the
physical effects of withdrawal from heroin addiction.
5. The Director may make recommendations to the President in connection with any federal drug traffic program. One of the Assistant Directors
of the Special Action Office is to maintain liaison with respect to all federal
drug traffic programs.
6. Before any controlled substance is transferred, added, or removed
from any of the schedules under the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, the
Attorney General must notify the Director. Similarly, the Secretary of HEW
must notify the Director, as well as the Attorney General, of any new drug applications which may pose a potential for abuse. 120
7. The Director is to give technical assistance to state and local agencies
in the field of drug abuse, to maintain a clearinghouse for all information on
drug abuse, and to draft model legislation for state and local purposes.
8. The Director must report to the President annually, specifying the objectives, activities, and accomplishments of the Special Action Office and accounting for all funds expended.
In carrying out his various responsibilities and functions, the Director has
the authority to make grants and contracts with federal departments and
agencies and with non-profit private agencies. 121 Similarly, the 1972 Act establishes a National Advisory Council for Drug Abuse to make recommendations to the Director with respect to overall planning and policy and the objectives and priorities of federal drug abuse prevention functions. 122 The
Council is composed of the Secretaries of HEW and Defense, the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs and twelve individuals appointed by the President.
C. Relation to HEW
In addition to creating the Special Action Office, the 1972 Act has important
consequences for various programs administered by the Secretary of HEW. 12
For instance, the Secretary:
1. may not approve an application for a community mental health center
grant unless the application provides for a treatment and rehabilitation program for drug addicts where such a program is feasible and needed;
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
id.
Id.

§ 209.
§ 210.
§§ 251-255.
Title IV §§ 401-413.
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2. must require that drug treatment and rehabilitation programs be established in appropriate Public Health Service facilities unless he determines
that there is not a sufficient need for such a program in a particular institution;
3. is authorized to suspend Federal support to any private or public hospital which refuses to treat a drug abuser in need of emergency medical help;
4. is authorized to make grants to states which submit plans for establishing and coordinating projects for the development of more effective drug
abuse prevention methods in the state; and
5. is authorized to make similar grants to public and private non-profit
organizations to carry on training, education, research or rehabilitation programs in the field of drug abuse. In addition to his existing responsibilities,
the 1972 Act confers additional drug abuse prevention responsibilities on
the Secretary of HEW, such as operating an information center for drug
abuse matters, publishing statistical data on drug abuse, etc. To assist the
Secretary in carrying out his duties, the National Advisory Council on Drug
Abuse makes recommendations to the Secretary on matters pertaining to
drug abuse. Finally, effective December 31, 1974, the Act establishes, in
the National Institute of Mental Health, a National Institute on Drug Abuse
to administer the various HEW programs concerned with drug abuse pre1 24
vention.
Two final aspects of the 1972 Act are worth mentioning. First, in order
to coordinate long term federal strategy in the areas of both drug abuse and
drug traffic prevention, the Act establishes a high level Strategy Council
comprised of the Director of the Special Action Office, the Attorney General, the Secretaries of State, HEW, and Defense, the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, and other officials as the President may deem appropriate.
Second, the 1972 Act recognizes the importance of the confidentiality of
patients' records. Thus, records of the identity, diagnois, prognosis, or treatment of a patient kept in connection with any drug abuse prevention function authorized or assisted under the provisions of the 1972 Act or any act
125
amended by it must be kept confidential.
D.

Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE)

On February 1, 1972 by Executive Order President Nixon created a new office within the Department of Justice to coordinate the drug law enforcement
efforts of the federal government. 12 6 In a sense, the new office was the
124. Id. Title I §§ 301-305.
125. Id. Title IV § 408.
126. Exec. Order No. 11,641, February 1, 1972.
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counterpart on the law enforcement side of the Special Action Office for
Drug Abuse Prevention. Myles J. Ambrose, former Commissioner of Customs, was appointed Director with a title of Special Assistant Attorney General.
By the terms of the Executive Order, the Director of the Office will advise
the President on all matters relating to the more effective federal enforcement of laws relating to illegal drug traffic and on methods by which the
federal government can assist state and local governments in strengthening
the enforcement of their laws relating to illegal drug traffic. The Director
is also mandated to recommend plans, programs, legislation, techniques, and
other measures to maximize the country's war on drugs. Specifically, the
Director is empowered to develop a concentrated law enforcement program
in the federal government and cooperate with state and local governments in
enforcing their drug laws.
In operation, the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement has concentrated its efforts at the street level drug trade. 1 27 Before ODALE, there
was little federal participation in enforcing drug laws against the ordinary
street pusher. Under Mr. Ambrose's leadership, however, a nationwide network of prosecutors, investigators, and special grand juries has been created
to assist state and local authorities in detecting, arresting, and convicting
"hard drug" pushers. Presently the Office is operating in at least 33 cities
throughout the country.
PART V-Historical Development and Present Status of Federal Drug
Penalty Provisions
Over the past sixty years, Congress has constantly reacted to statistics showing increased drug abuse in America by increasing penalties for drug offenders. A review of the federal penalty provisions will show that the es12
calation has been consistent and, at times, even dramatic.
A.

Pre-1970 Narcotic Penalties

1. Early Pattern
Prior to 1951, there were basically two patterns of penalties depending on
the act violated. For convenience, the two patterns can be called importexport penalties and Harrison Act penalties.
a) Import-Export Penalties: When the importation of opium was pro127. N.Y. Times, January 29, 1972, p.1.
128. See

DEALING AND DRUG ABUSE,

A

REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION,

for a discussion of federal expenditures on drug abuse control.

300-328
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hibited in 1909, the offender was subject to fines "not exceeding five
thousand dollars nor less than fifty dollars, or by imprisonment for any
time not exceeding two years or both. ' 129 An identical provision was
contained in the 1914 Narcotic Drug Export Act. 30° By 1922, there had
been a dramatic increase in import penalties. For violations of the import
provisions of the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act, the penalty was a
fine of not more than five thousand dollars and imprisonment for not
more than ten years.13 ' Where prior drug laws had cast penalties in
the alternative, either a fine or imprisonment or both, this Act mandated
both a fine and a prison term. The penalties for illegal export, however,
were not increased.
b) Harrison Act Penalties: When it was enacted in 1914, violators of
the Harrison Act were subject to a fine of not more than two thousand
dollars or imprisonment for not more than five years or both.' 32 Identical
penalties were provided for violations of the Marihuana Tax Act of
1937.1"3
2.

Unified Penalties of 1951

In 1951, however, Congress totally revamped the then-existing penalty structure under prodding from the Bureau of Narcotics.134 First of all, penalties
for all drug offenses were made uniform, no matter how trivial or serious the
offense. Thus, the penalties for failing to register as a drug distributor or
for illegally importing drugs were made identical. Second, the severity of
the penalties themselves was increased by requiring mandatory minimum
prison terms and by lengthening the possible maximum sentence. A first offense entailed a fine of not more than two thousand dollars and a prison term
of not less than two nor more than five years. For a second offense, the fine
remained the same but the prison term jumped to not less than five nor
more than ten years. For a third or subsequent offense, the prison term
was increased to not less than ten nor more than twenty years. Of equal
significance was a provision which denied both a suspended sentence and
any form of probation to a second or subsequent offender.
3.

Ammendments of 1956

By 1956, Congress had grown dissatisfied with its handiwork of five years
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Ch. 100, § 2, 35 Stat. 614 (1909).
Ch. 9, § 7, 38 Stat. 275 (1914).
Ch. 202, § 2(c), 42 Stat. 596 (1922).
Ch. 1, § 9, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
Ch. 553, § 12, 50 Stat. 551 (1937).
Ch. 666, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 65 Stat. 767 (1951).
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before and decided to increase penalties yet again. 135 At least this time
Congress did differentiate between serious drug offenses and those less serious in nature. For illegally importing narcotics or for transferring them
without the required order form, the prison term was now set at not less than
five nor more than twenty years for a first offense; and at not less than ten
nor more than forty years for a second or subsequent offense. The possible
fine for first or second offenses was raised to twenty thousand dollars.
Penalities for sales of drugs to minors were set even higher; indeed, for a sale
of illegally imported heroin to a minor, there was a possibility of the death
penalty. Consistent with the increased severity of these penalties, Congress
denied the right to a suspended sentence, probation, or parole to even the
first offender convicted of a serious drug offense.
Even for less serious drug offenses, such as failing to register and pay the
occupational tax, Congress increased existing penalties, although, in doing so,
it did not set them as high as for illegal importation or similar offenses.
Thus, for a first offense, the penalty was set at a prison term of not less than
two nor more than ten years and a fine of not more than twenty thousand
dollars. For a second offense, the prison sentence jumped to not less than
five nor more than twenty years; and for a third or subsequent offense, to
not less than ten nor more than forty years. A suspended sentence, probation and parole, however, were still available to the first offender convicted
of these less serious offenses.
B.

Pre-1970Dangerous Drug Penalties

As mentioned above, depressant, stimulant, and hallucinogenic drugs were
regulated by the 1965 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act and not by the narcotic laws. 136 First offenders were punishable by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars or both. For a second offense, the penalty was increased to
not more than three years or a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or
both.'3 7 Stiffer penalties, however, were provided for selling dangerous
drugs to persons under twenty-one years of age. In such cases, the penalty
was a prison term of not more than two years or a fine of not more than five
thousand dollars or both.
Just as in the case of narcotic drugs, however, Congress became dissatisfied with these penalties and enacted tougher ones three years later in
135. Ch. 629, § 103, 70 Stat. 567 (1956).
136. Pub. L. No. 89-74, § 7, 79 Stat. 226 (1965).
137. Ch. 675, § 303(a), 52 Stat. 1043 (1938).

For a full discussion of the pen-

alty provisions of these 1965 amendments, see Rosenthal, supra note 77 at 1058.
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1968.1. s The unlawful manufacture, sale or possession with intent to sell of
a dangerous drug was made punishable by up to five years in jail, a fine of
up to ten thousand dollars, or both. For selling to someone under twentyone, the penalty was set higher-imprisonment for not more than ten years,
a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars, or both. It must be said,
however, that Congress did not set mandatory minimum sentences as it did
for narcotic violations, nor did Congress deny an offender eligibility for a
suspended sentence or probation.
C.

Present Penalty Provisionsfor Narcotics and
Dangerous Drug Offenses

The penalty provisions of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 are complex and variegated, not lending themselves to easy analysis. Five different
categories of penalties need be considered.
1.

1 9
3

Unlawful Manufacture, Trafficking and Similar Offenses

The 1970 Act imposes identical punishment for illegally manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, or attempting or conspiring to do any of these acts. The severity of
the penalties, however, depends on the type of controlled substance involved.
a) In the case of a controlled substance in schedules I or II which is also
a narcotic drug, the person is subject to a jail sentence of up to fifteen
years, a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars, or both.
Any prison term imposed must be accompanied by a special parole term
of at least three years in addition to a prison term. If, for any reason, parole is revoked, the original term of imprisonment is increased by the period of the special parole term.
b) In the case of a controlled substance in schedules I or II which is not
a narcotic drug, or a controlled substance in schedule III, the person is
subject to a prison term of not more than five years, a fine of not more
than fifteen thousand dollars, or both. A special parole term of at least
two years is also imposed.
c) In the case of a controlled substance in schedule IV, the prison term
is lowered further still to not more than three years; the fine, to not more
138. Act of Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-639, § 3, 82 Stat. 1361.
139. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970). It should be noted that the 1970 Controlled Substances
Act permits search warrants to be served at any time of the day or night if the judge or
United States magistrate issuing the warrant is satisfied that there is probable cause to
believe that grounds exist for the warrant and for its service at such time. A judge or
United States marshal may include a "no-knock" provision in the warrant. 21 U.S.C.
§ 879(a) and (b) (1970).
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than ten thousand dollars. The special parole term is decreased to at
least one year.
d) In the case of a controlled substance in schedule V, the prison term is
lowered to not more than one year; the fine, to not more than five thousand dollars. No special parole term is imposed.
In each of these categories, the prison sentence, fine, and special parole
term are doubled for a second offender. Penalties are also doubled for
anyone eighteen years or older who distributes a controlled substance to
someone under twenty-one.
These general penalty provisions applicable to manufacturing and trafficking offenses admit of many exceptions. These exceptions, however, fall into
two basic categories. One scales down the criminal penalties; the other substitutes civil for criminal penalties.
The first category includes such offenses as: 1) a registrant's knowing and
intentional distribution of a controlled substance in schedules I or II in the
course of his legitimate business without a proper order form; 2) the use of a
fictitious or revoked registration number; 3) the acquisition of a controlled
substance by fraud, forgery, or misrepresentation; and 4) the use of the
mails, telephone, radio, and all other means of communication to commit or
to facilitate the commission of a felony under the Act. 140 For such offenses,
the penalty is imprisonment for not more than four years, a fine of not more
than thirty thousand dollars, or both. There is no special parole term imposed. For a second offense, the fine and jail term are doubled.
Only civil penalties are provided for the second group of offenses--of141
fenses which are considered only minor infractions of the 1970 Act.
Thus, for a registrant who manufactures a controlled substance in schedules
I or II which is either not expressly authorized by his registration or is in excess of his assigned manufacturing quota, the penalty is a fine of not more
than twenty-five thousand dollars. The same penalty is provided for someone who removes or obliterates required symbols or labels on packages or
who fails to keep, make, or furnish any record or report required by the Act.
However, if any of these offenses (for which a civil penalty is provided) is
committed knowingly or after a prior offense against the drug laws, the person convicted becomes liable for imprisonment as well as for a fine.
2.

42

1
Unlawful Possession

For unlawful possession of a controlled substance in any one of the five
140. 21 U.S.C. § 843 (1970).
141. 21 U.S.C. § 842 (1970).

142. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970).

It should be noted that any person who distributes a

19731

Drug Control

schedules the punishment is a prison term of not more than one year, a fine
of not more than five thousand dollars, or both. Penalties double for a second offense.
A special procedure is available to the first offender. Where the offense
is his first, the court is empowered to defer further legal proceedings and
place the offender on probation. If he does not violate the conditions of
his probation, the court will discharge the offender and dismiss the proceedings against him.
3.

143

Continuing CriminalEnterprise

For a person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise, the 1970
Act changes its pattern somewhat, requiring (a) that a mandatory minimum
sentence of ten years be imposed (life imprisonment is the maximum); (b)
that a fine of not more than one hundred thousand dollars be assessed; (c)
that a suspended sentence or probation not be granted; and, finally (d) that
any profits garnered in the enterprise be forfeited to the United States. A
person is considered to be engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if he
(a) commits a felony which is part of a continuing series of drug offenses;
(b) acts in concert with at least five other persons to commit these offenses;
(c) commands some organizational or supervisory position with respect to
the group; and (d) obtains substantial income from the enterprise. The provision is clearly aimed at the importer and the high level dealer who commands a drug distribution network.
4.

Dangerous Special Drug Offender

Special penalties are also singled out for the so-called "dangerous special
drug offender. ' 144 A defendant who is over twenty-one years of age and has
been convicted but not yet sentenced for a drug felony can be declared a
dangerous special drug offender in a separate judicial hearing prior to sentencing. If he is determined to be such a dangerous special drug offender by
a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall sentence the defendant to
imprisonment for an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and
not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized
by law for the felony which he committed. In other words, for the sake of
protecting the public from further criminal conduct, the period of confinement imposed on a dangerous drug offender can exceed the period of consmall amount of marihuana for no remuneration shall be punished under § 844 and not
under § 841, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)4 (1970).
143. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970).
144. 21 U.S.C. § 849 (1970).
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finement otherwise provided for the particular offense committed. In order
to be classified as a dangerous special drug offender, the defendant must
meet certain statutory requirements: (a) the defendant must have been
previously convicted in a state or federal court of two or more offenses
involving dealing in controlled substances-offenses which were committed
at different times but each punishable by more than one year in jail; (b) the
defendant must have been imprisoned for one of these prior offenses and less
than five years must have elapsed between the present felony and his release
from prison or the commission of a prior drug offense; (c) the defendant
must have committed the present felony as part of a criminal pattern of
dealing in controlled substances which constitutes a substantial source of
his income; (d) the defendant must have committed his present offense as
part of a conspiracy with at least three other persons to engage in a pattern
of dealing in controlled substances, and the defendant must have agreed to
initiate, organize, plan, finance, direct, manage, gove or receive a bribe, or
use force in connection with such dealing.
5.

145

Import and Export Penalties

As in the case of unlawful manufacture, the penalties for unlawful import
or export of controlled substances depends on the nature of the substance
involved. Thus, if a narcotic drug in schedules I or II is illegally imported
or exported, the penalty is severe-a prison term of not more than fifteen
years, a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars, or both. A special parole term of at least three years is also imposed. The penalties for illegal import of a controlled substance other than a narcotic drug in schedules
I or II is imprisonment for not more than five years, a fine of not more than
fifteen thousand dollars, or both. A special parole term is also imposed but
the length of the term is determined by the type of controlled substance involved.
For a second offense, the statute generally provides double the penalty.
Attempts and conspiracies are treated as if the offense attempted or planned
had been committed. Finally, the 1970 Act provides civil penalties for transhipment of controlled substances to another country unless such offense was
knowingly and intentionally committed, in which event criminal penalties
are provided.
D.

InterrelationshipBetween Penalty Provisions

For purposes of analysis, this article has separated penalties into varying
categories, such as penalties for illegal importation, for illegal manufacture,
145.

21 U.S.C. §§ 960-963 (1970).
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for possession, etc. From this it should not be inferred that these categories
are separate and distinct. Quite the contrary. Any single offense against
the drug laws as often as not involves multiple violations. Take, for example, someone arrested for illegally selling heroin.
1. Under the Harrison Act, there would have been an automatic threecount indictment, charging the defendant with the following violations: (1)
selling narcotic drugs not in the original stamped package or from the original
stamped package; 146 (2) selling narcotic drugs without the proper written
order form ;147 and (3) selling illegally imported heroin, knowing it to have
been illegally imported. 1 48 Possession of a narcotic drug at any time created
a presumption that the drug had been illegally imported and the defendant
had knowledge of the illegal importation.
2. Under the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, there is a two-count indictment, charging possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance
and illegal distribution of a controlled substance.
Although beyond the scope of this paper, interesting comparisons can be
drawn between the penalty provisions under the Harrison Act as amended
in 1951 and 1956 and the new Controlled Substances Act of 1970. Under
the old law a minimum mandatory prison sentence was imposed, while under present law there is generally no minimum required sentence. It would
seem that the prosecutor was in a stronger bargaining position under the old
law than he is now. Since the 1956 amendments to the Harrison Act imposed harsher mandatory sentences for some offenses than for others, the
prosecutor could threaten an offender with the more serious charge unless he
cooperated. Under the present law, the prosecutor can never be sure what
penalty will be meted out by a judge. As a result, the federal drug offender
today may be less disposed to plea bargain and more prone to take the risks
incident to a full trial.
Conclusion
Until the turn of the century the basic federal attitude toward the distribution
and use of narcotics by the general public was permissive. Narcotic substances and their use were regarded as a matter of personal choice not requiring the intervention of the federal government. This attitude was not inconsistent with a recognition that narcotics were far more dangerous than
routine household items and that those who used them might be subject, per146. Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1147, §§ 6-7, 68 Stat. 1003.
147. Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1147, § 8, 68 Stat. 1004.
148. Act of Nov. 2, 1951, cb. 666, § (c), 65 Stat. 767.
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haps, to moral censure. This general approach was dominant until well
into the 1900's.
After the turn of the century there was a shift from a posture of permissiveness to one of repression which was characterized by a federal effort to
proscribe the distribution and use of narcotics except within narrow and
tightly controlled channels for recognized medical purposes. This approach
developed slowly. First, there were the ever increasing tariffs on imported
smoking opium, then the outright ban on all imported opium not needed for
medical uses, and, finally, there were the regulatory provisions of the Harrison Act, effectively forcing the addict to turn not to the medical profession
but to the illicit drug market for his daily supply. This black market became
the mechanism by which drugs were distributed in the world of the drug user.
Attempts by law enforcement agents to control this market have led to even
more repressive federal regulation. Penalties were escalated, informers paid,
vehicles seized. When these tactics showed little apparent success, suspicion
grew that perhaps it was the local law enforcement systems which were
partly to blame. There was talk of "soft judges" who misguidedly coddled
criminals. This led to mandatory minimum sentences, thus preventing
judges from ameliorating the harshness of the penalties. Most recently, federal agents, in such programs as ODALE, have begun to work directly with
local police to combat distribution of drugs at the street level. The end result of this process is a comprehensive federal criminal statute limiting the
use of controlled substances and significant federal intervention through the
BNDD and ODALE at every level of international, national and local drug
149
distribution.
149. Still a third federal approach can be termed "medical," for want of a better
word. It has not been developed in this article which is designed to focus on federal
control of the distribution and use of drugs rather than on the rehabilitation of the
addict. This third federal approach categorizes the drug addict not as a criminal but
as a patient and looks not to his imprisonment but to his treatment. One of the earliest
efforts along these lines was the use of narcotics by the medical profession to treat the

addict. This led, in the wake of the Harrison Act, to the creation of the clinics of the

1920's and the dispensation by private physicians of morphine, heroin and cocaine to
the drug addict. These early efforts were short-lived due to the vigorous use of the
Harrison Act by federal drug enforcement personnel. The same theme emerged again,
however, some forty years later, in 1963, with the work of Doctors Dole and Nyswander. In this instance the narcotic substance was methadone but the medical concern was the same, i.e., the use of a narcotic substance to treat the addict. Methadone
treatment did not meet the fate of the clinics of the 1920's. Perhaps sobered by years
of enforcement of the Harrison Act in the face of an ever-growing drug problem,
methadone was accepted on an experimental basis. It rapidly became an important
federal concern and found support in federal monies allocated under the NARA program
of 1966 and later legislation. Its use is still technically "experimental" but it remains
a strong national theme and is conceived by many as viable federal alternative to the
use of the criminal law.
Another form of this medical approach has been to categorize drug addiction as a
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Assessing the success of the repressive or drug suppression approach to
the drug problem is not the object of this article which seeks only to describe. One observation, however, may be made by way of clarification.
The use of criminal law sanctions in the suppression of narcotics operates in
at least three different ways. For some, the presence of the law is enough
to inhibit use of the interdicted item. The use of drugs is a crime and for
many, indeed for most, that is enough.
A second effect of the law is to make drugs hard to obtain. The practical
consequence of this is that drugs are not readily available-thereby reducing the possibilities of their use wholly apart from any moral or civic attitudes regarding either the law or the use of drugs. Here again the law succeeds.
The troublesome area of the law's operation is in its application to those in
the drug subculture itself. In this area federal drug control legislation presents itself as an effort to prevent individuals who are strongly motivated
and determined from buying and selling narcotics. Here the federal drug
control legislation operates in much the same way as did prohibition legislation. The test of the effectiveness of the effort is only in part the law itself. Far more important are the national attitudes and infrastructures
which apply the law to the problem-the police, the courts, the prisons. It
is here that problems multiply, results discourage, and the urge to reassess
takes its stand.

type of character disorder. So conceived the drug addict found a place with the mental
case and the alcoholic, all incapable of caring for themselves. This concept led to
the authorization of Lexington and Fort Worth in 1929 and later came to full flower
in the commitment provisions of the NARA of 1966. This same character disorder
theme finds expression in the various therapeutic communities such as Synanon or
Phoenix House, designed to get the addict to work through his "problem" in a supportive
but drug free environment. This approach has also found federal support through the
funding provisions of the NARA act of 1966 and later legislation.

